Bitcoin is a top-ranked cryptocurrency that has experienced huge growth and survived numerous a acks. e protocols making up Bitcoin must therefore accommodate the growth of the network and ensure security.
INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer (P2P) electronic cash system [44] . Recent estimates indicate that there are over 60,000 nodes in the Bitcoin network 1 (as of March 2019). To keep up with the growth in the number of nodes and usage of the network, the system must be continually optimized while retaining the security guarantees that its users have come to expect.
Security of the Bitcoin network depends on adequate network connectivity. Bitcoin literature has repeatedly recommended increasing the number of connections between nodes to make the network more robust [7, 15] . As we explain in Section 3, certain a acks become less successful if the network is highly connected.
Unfortunately, increasing the connectivity of the Bitcoin network linearly increases the bandwidth consumption of transaction relaythe protocol that currently takes up half of the total bandwidth required to operate a Bitcoin node. Today, transaction relay alone consumes as much as 18GB per node per month. If the connectivity 1 h ps://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/ les/charts/so ware.html were increased from the currently used eight outbound connections to 24, the per-node bandwidth used for relaying transactions would exceed 50GB/month. is would make it prohibitively expensive for some users to operate a Bitcoin node. Despite this ine ciency, transaction relay has not received much a ention in scienti c literature, in contrast to block relay [2, 12, 48] .
e overarching reason why the Bitcoin transaction relay protocol is ine cient is that it relies on ooding. A Bitcoin transaction corresponds to a transfer of funds between several accounts. Fig. 1 overviews the lifecycle of a transaction in the Bitcoin network. To be accepted by the network of nodes, a transaction must be rst disseminated, or relayed, throughout the network. en it must be validated and included into a block with other valid transactions. Finally, the block containing the transaction must be relayed to all the nodes. Every Bitcoin transaction must reach almost all nodes in the network, and prior work has demonstrated that full coverage of the network is important for security [53] .
Today, Bitcoin disseminates transactions by ensuring that every message received by a node is transmi ed to all of its neighbors.
is ooding has high fault-tolerance since no single point of failure will halt relay, and it has low latency since nodes learn about transactions as fast as possible [35] .
However, ooding has poor bandwidth e ciency: every node in the network learns about the transaction multiple times. Our empirical measurements demonstrate that transaction announcements account for 30-50% of the overall Bitcoin tra c. is ine ciency is an important scalability limitation: the ine ciency increases as the network becomes more connected, while connectivity of the network is desirable to the growth and the security of the network.
Prior work has explored two principal approaches to address this ine cient use of bandwidth. e rst is the use of short transaction identi ers (to decrease message size) [31] .
e second is to exclusively use blocks and never transmit individual transactions [37] . Both approaches are inadequate: short identi ers only reduce the constant factor and do not scale with the connectivity of the network, while using only blocks creates spikes in block relay and transaction validation. We discuss these approaches further in Section 11.
e contribution of this paper is Erlay, a new protocol that we designed to optimize Bitcoin's transaction relay while maintaining the existing security guarantees. e main idea behind our protocol is to reduce the amount of information propagated via ooding and instead use an e cient set reconciliation method [42] for most of the transaction dissemination. In addition, we design the Erlay protocol to withstand DoS, timing, and other a acks.
We implemented Erlay in a simulator and as part of the mainline Bitcoin node so ware, and evaluated Erlay at scale. Our results show that Erlay makes announcement-related bandwidth negligible while keeping latency a small fraction of the inter-block interval.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We analyze bandwidth ine ciency of Bitcoin's transaction relay protocol. We do this by running a node connected to the Bitcoin network as well as by running a simulation of the Bitcoin network. Our results demonstrate that 88% of the bandwidth used to announce transactions (and around 44% of the overall bandwidth) is redundant.
• We propose a new, bandwidth-e cient, transaction relay protocol for Bitcoin called Erlay, which is a combination of fast low-fanout ooding and e cient set reconciliation, designed to work under the assumptions of the Bitcoin network.
• We demonstrate that the protocol achieves a close to optimal combination of resource consumption and propagation delay, and is robust to a acks. Erlay reduces the bandwidth used to announce transactions by 84% immediately, and allows the Bitcoin network to achieve higher connectivity in the future for be er security.
Next, we review the background for our work.
BITCOIN BACKGROUND
For the purpose of connectivity graph and propagation analysis, there are 2 types of nodes in the Bitcoin network: private nodes that do not accept inbound connections and public nodes that do accept inbound connections (see Fig. 2 ). Public nodes act as a backbone of the network: they help new nodes bootstrap onto the network. Once they have joined the network, public and private nodes are indistinguishable in their operation: both node types perform transaction and block validation, and relay valid transactions and blocks to their peers.
e current version of the Bitcoin transaction relay protocol propagates messages among nodes using di usion [1], which is a variation on random ooding. Flooding is a protocol where each node announces every transaction it receives to each of its peers. Announcements can be sent on either inbound and outbound links. With di usion, a peer injects a random delay before announcing a received transaction to its peers. is mitigates timing a acks [46] and signi cantly reduces the probability of in-ight collisions (when two nodes simultaneously announce the same transaction over the link between them).
e protocol by which a transaction propagates between two peers is illustrated in Fig. 3 . When a Bitcoin node receives a transaction (peer 1 in Fig. 3) , it advertises the transaction to all of its peers except for the node that sent the transaction in the rst place and other nodes from which it already received an advertisement. To advertise a transaction, a node sends a hash of the transaction within an inventory, or INV message. If a node (peer 2 in Fig. 3 ) hears about a transaction for the rst time, it will request the full transaction by sending a GETDATA message to the node that sent it the INV message.
We refer to the transaction-advertising portion of the protocol (all the INV messages) as BTCFlood. Since it relies on ooding, most transactions are advertised through each link in the network in one direction (except those that are advertised during the block relay phase). As a result, a node with n connections will send and receive between n and 2n INV messages for a single transaction (two nodes may announce the same transaction simultaneously to each other).
Both public and private nodes limit the number of inbound and outbound connections (Fig. 2) . By default a private node has no inbound connections and up to 8 outbound connections, while a public node can have 8 outbound connections as well as up to 125 inbound connections (but the inbound connection limit can be congured up to around 1,000). us, as the number of private nodes in the Bitcoin network grows, the bandwidth and computational requirements to run a public node quickly increase. is is because private nodes connect to multiple public nodes to ensure that they are connected to the network through more than a single peer.
As a result, Bitcoin designers have focused on (1) making the running of a public node more accessible, in terms of required bandwidth, computational power, and hardware resources, and (2) making public nodes more e cient so that they can accept more connections from private nodes. Our work targets both objectives.
THE PROBLEM WITH FLOODING TRANSACTIONS
Flooding is ine cient. BTCFlood sends many redundant transaction announcements. To see why, let us rst consider how many announcements would be sent if the protocol were e cient. Since, optimally, each node would receive each announcement exactly once, the number of times each announcement is sent should be equal to the number of nodes. Next, let us consider how many times an announcement is sent with BTCFlood. By de nition, each node relays an announcement on each of the links except the one where that announcement originally arrived. In other words, each link sees each announcement once, if no two nodes ever send the same announcement to each other simultaneously, and more than once if they do. erefore, in BTCFlood each announcement is sent at least as many times as the number of links.
If N is the number of nodes in the Bitcoin network, the number of links is 8N , because each node must make eight outbound connections. erefore, the number of redundant announcements is at least 8N − N = 7N . Each announcement takes 32 bytes out of 300 total bytes needed to relay a single transaction to one node. ( ese 300 bytes include the announcement, the response and the full transaction body). erefore, if at least seven out of eight announcements are redundant (corresponding to 224 bytes), at least 43% of all announcement tra c is wasteful.
We validated this analysis experimentally. We con gured a public Bitcoin node with eight outbound connections and ran it for one week. During this time, our node also received four inbound connections. We measured the bandwidth dedicated to transaction announcements and other transaction dissemination tra c. A received announcement was considered redundant if it corresponded to an already known transaction. A sent announcement was considered redundant if it was not followed by a transaction request. According to our measurements (taken at multiple nodes at di erent locations) 10% of the tra c corresponding to received announcements and 95% of the tra c corresponding to the sent announcements was redundant. Overall, 55% of all tra c used by our node was redundant. Higher connectivity requires more bandwidth. Given that the amount of redundant tra c is proportional to the number of links, increasing the connectivity of the network (the number of outbound links per node) linearly increases bandwidth consumption in BTCFlood.
We modeled how the bandwidth consumption of disseminating one transaction across the network of 60K nodes increases with connectivity. Fig. 4 (whose results we con rmed via simulation) shows that announcement tra c turns dominant as the network becomes more connected. With eight connections per node, a private node may consume 9GB of bandwidth per month just for announcing transactions. Se ing connectivity to 24 in Bitcoin today would cause transaction relay to consume over 15GB/month. Higher connectivity o ers more security. In P2P networks, higher connectivity improves network security. is was demonstrated by both traditional P2P research [4, 5] and Bitcoin-speci c prior work [7, 15, 29, 36, 47] .
Certain a acks become less successful if the network is highly connected [28, 36, 46] . e eclipse a ack paper [29] has shown that fewer than 13 connections would be detrimental to the security of the network. A recently discovered vulnerability [17] relies on InvBlock [41] . InvBlock is a technique that prevents a transaction from being propagated by rst announcing it to a node, but then withholding the transaction contents for two minutes. With higher connectivity, this a ack is easier to mitigate.
PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS
R1: Scale with the number of connections. Our main goal is to design a transaction dissemination protocol that has good scalability as a function of the number of connections. is way, we can make the network more secure without sacri cing performance. R2: Maintain a network topology suited for a decentralized environment. Bitcoin's premise of a decentralized environment puts constraints on the design of its network. Although imposing a structure onto a network, e.g., by organizing it into a tree or star topology, or by using DHT-style routing, enables bandwidthe cient implementation of ooding, this also introduces the risks of censorship or partitioning [36] .
e topology of the network must, therefore, remain unstructured, and routing decisions must be made independently by every node based on their local state. R3: Maintain a reasonable latency. Transaction propagation delays should remain in the ballpark of those experienced with the existing protocol. Low latency is essential to user experience and enables be er e ciency in block relay [12] . R4: Be robust to attacks under the existing threat model. Our protocol must remain robust under the same threat model as that assumed by the existing protocol. Similarly to Bitcoin, we assume that an a acker has control over a limited, non-majority, number of nodes in the network, has a limited ability to make other nodes connect to it, and is otherwise unrestricted in intercepting and generating tra c for peers that it is connected to. e transaction relay protocol must not be any more susceptible to DoS a acks and client deanonymization, and must not leak any more information about the network topology [46] than the existing protocol.
ERLAY DESIGN
Traditionally, P2P networks addressed ine ciency of ooding by imposing a structured overlay onto an ad-hoc topology. We refrained from structured network organizations for security reasons discussed in Section 4. Instead, our design relies on two common system-building techniques: delay and batching.
Instead of announcing every transaction on each link, a node using our protocol advertises it to a subset of peers-this is called low-fanout ooding. To make sure that all transactions reach the entire network, nodes periodically engage in an interactive protocol to discover announcements that were missed, and request missing transactions. is is called set reconciliation. Our protocol, Erlay, is comprised of low-fanout ooding and set reconciliation (Fig. 5) .
Low-fanout ooding. e rationale behind low-fanout ooding is to expediently relay a transaction to be within a small number of hops from every node in the network. If each transaction ends up close to every node, then reconciliation can nish dissemination using a small number of rounds. erefore, a key decision in low-fanout ooding is to which peers to relay.
Set reconciliation. Set reconciliation was proposed as an alternative to synchronization in distributed systems [42] . Using set reconciliation a node in a P2P network periodically compares its local state to the state of its peers, and sends/requests only the necessary information (the state di erence). Set reconciliation may be viewed as an e cient version of batching (accumulating multiple state updates and sending them as a single message). e key challenge in practical reconciliation is for the peers to e ciently compute their missing transaction state, and to limit the exchanged transactions to just those that the other peer is missing. Fig. 6 shows how Erlay a empts to nd a sweet spot in terms of bandwidth and latency by combining ooding, which wastes bandwidth but disseminates transactions quickly, and reconciliation, which takes longer, but does not waste bandwidth.
Low-fanout ooding
Flooding is expensive, so we want to use it sparingly and in strategic locations. For that reason, only well-connected public nodes ood transactions to other public nodes via outbound connections. Since every private node is directly connected to several public nodes, this policy ensures that a transaction is quickly propagated to be within one hop from the majority of the nodes in the network. As a result, only one or two reconciliation rounds are needed for full reachability (R3). According to this, the protocol we propose may be viewed as two-tier optimistic replication [51] .
To meet our scalability goal (R1), we limit the ooding done by public nodes to eight outbound connections even if the total number of these connections is higher. is way, increasing connectivity does not increase transaction dissemination cost proportionally. e decision to relay through outbound connections, but not the inbound ones, was made to defend against timing a acks [17, 46] . In a timing a ack, an a acker connects to a victim and listens to all transactions that a victim might send on that link (the inbound connection for the victim). If an a acker learns about a transaction from multiple nodes (including the victim), the timing of transaction arrival can be used to guess whether a transaction originated at the victim: if it did then it will most likely arrive from the victim earlier than from other nodes. BTCFlood introduces a di usion delay to prevent timing a acks. In Erlay, since we do not forward individual transactions to inbound links, this delay is not necessary. So this decision favors both R3 and R4.
Transactions in the Bitcoin network may originate at both public and private nodes. In the protocol we propose, nodes do not relay their transactions via ooding, so the network learns about the transactions they have originated via reconciliation: private nodes add their own transactions to the batch of other transactions that they forward to their peers during reconciliation. is is used to hide when transactions are originated at private nodes. If transactions were instead ooded from private nodes, it would be obvious to public nodes that those transactions must have been created at those nodes, because according to the chosen ooding policy, this is the only case where a private node oods a transaction, as they have no inbound links. Since a private node forwards its own transactions as part of a batch, as opposed to individually, a malicious public node is unlikely to discover the origin of a transaction (R4).
Set reconciliation
In Erlay peers perform set reconciliation by computing a local set sketch, as de ned by the PinSketch algorithm [18] . A set sketch is a type of set checksum with two important properties:
• Sketches have a predetermined capacity, and when the number of elements in the set does not exceed the capacity, it is always possible to recover the entire set from the sketch by decoding the sketch. A sketch of b-bit elements with capacity c can be stored in bc bits.
• A sketch of the symmetric di erence between the two sets (i.e., all elements that occur in one but not both input sets), can be obtained by XORing the bit representation of sketches of those sets.
ese properties make sketches appropriate for a bandwidthe cient set reconciliation protocol. More speci cally, if two parties, Alice and Bob, each have a set of elements, and they suspect that these sets largely but not entirely overlap, they can use the following protocol to have both parties learn all the elements of the two sets:
• Alice and Bob both locally compute sketches of their sets.
• Alice sends her sketch to Bob.
• Bob combines the two sketches, and obtains a sketch of the symmetric di erence.
• Bob tries to recover the elements from the symmetric difference sketch.
• Bob sends to Alice the elements that she is missing. is procedure will always succeed when the size of the di erence (elements that Alice has but Bob does not have plus elements that Bob has but Alice does not have) does not exceed the capacity of the sketch that Alice sent. Otherwise, the procedure is very likely to fail.
A key property of this process is that it works regardless of the actual set sizes: only the size of the set di erences ma ers.
Decoding the sketch is computationally expensive and is quadratic in the size of the di erence. Because of this, accurately estimating the size of the di erence (Section 5.2.1) and reconciling before the set di erence becomes too large (Section 5.2.2) are important goals for the protocol. Fig. 7 summarizes the reconciliation protocol. To execute a round of reconciliation, every node maintains a reconciliation set for each one of its peers. A reconciliation set consists of short IDs of transactions that a node would have sent to a corresponding peer in regular BTCFlood, but has not because Erlay limits ooding. We will refer to Alice's reconciliation set for Bob as A and Bob's set for Alice as B. Alice and Bob will compute the sketches for these reconciliation sets as described in the previous section.
Reconciliation round.
Important parameters of the protocol are: D -the true size of the set di erence, d -an estimate of D, and q -a parameter used to compute d. We provide the derivation of these values below. First, we describe a reconciliation round: and XORs the two sketches. Now Alice has a sketch of the di erence between A and B. (5) If the di erence size was estimated correctly, Alice is able to decode the sketch computed in the previous step, request the transactions that she is missing from Bob, and then advertise to Bob the transactions that he is missing. If the estimation was incorrect (sketch decoding failed), Alice will resort to bisection (Section 5.2.3). (6) A er this process, Alice updates q (see below) and clears A. Bob clears B. Accurate estimation of D is crucial for success of reconciliation. Prior work estimated D using techniques like min-wise hashing [10] or random projections [24] . ese techniques are complex, and we were concerned that they could end up using more bandwidth than they save. erefore, we resorted to a minimalistic approach, where we estimate the size of the set di erence based on just the current sizes of sets and the di erence observed in the previous reconciliation round:
where q is a oating point coe cient (derived below) that characterizes previous reconciliation, and c is a parameter for handling special cases.
Indeed, the di erence between two sets cannot be smaller than the di erence in their sizes. To avoid costly underestimations, we add the size of the smaller set normalized by q, and a constant c = 1, which prevents estimating d = 0 when |A| = |B| and q · min(|A|, |B|) = 0. e coe cient q characterizes earlier reconciliation, so before the very rst reconciliation round it is set to zero. At the end of a reconciliation round, we simply update q based on the true D that we discovered during the round, by substituting D for d in the above equation, dropping c, and then solving for q:
is updated q will be used in the next reconciliation round. We compute q in this way because we assume that every node in the network will have a consistent optimal q.
Reconciliation is a fertile ground for DoS a acks, because decoding a sketch is computationally expensive. To prevent these a acks, in our protocol the node that is interested in reconciliation (and the one that has to decode the sketch) initiates reconciliation (Alice, in our example). Bob cannot coerce Alice to perform excessive sketch decoding.
Reconciliation schedule.
Every node initiates reconciliation with one outbound peer every T seconds. Choosing the right value for T is important for performance and bandwidth consumption. If T is too low, reconciliation will run too o en and will use Reconciliation protocol with correct di erence estimation (Reconcile-Init, followed by Di Exchange), and reconciliation protocol with incorrect di erence estimation (Reconcile-Init, followed by Reconcile-Bisec). In case reconciliation fails during Reconcile-Bisec, reconciliation falls back to Bitcoin's current exchange method (see Fig. 3 ).
more bandwidth than it saves. If T is too high, reconciliation sets will be large and decoding set di erences will be expensive (the computation is quadratic in the number of di erences). A large T also increases the latency of transaction propagation.
A node reconciles with one peer every T seconds. Since every node has c outbound connections, every link in the network would, on average, run reconciliation every T · c seconds.
is means that the average reconciliation set prior to reconciliation would contain T · c · T X r at e transactions, where T X r at e is the global transaction rate. is also means that during the interval between reconciliations every node would receive T · T X r at e transactions.
We use a value of 1 second for T in Erlay. With this se ing, and the current ratio of private to public nodes, every public node will perform about eight reconciliations per second. Given the current maximum Bitcoin network transaction rate T X r at e of 7 transactions/s, the average di erence set size for this protocol is 7 elements. We evaluate our choice of parameters in Section 8.
5.2.3
Bisection for set di erence estimation failure. Our set reconciliation approach relies on the assumption that an upper bound for the set di erence between two peers is predictable. at is, if the actual di erence is higher than estimated, then reconciliation will fail. is failure is detectable by a client computing the di erence. An obvious solution to this failure is to recompute and retransmit the sketch assuming a larger di erence in the sets. However, this would make prior reconciliation transmissions useless, which is ine cient.
Instead, Erlay uses reconciliation bisection, which reuses previously transmi ed information. Bisection is based on the assumption that elements are uniformly distributed in reconciliation sets (this may be achieved by hashing). If a node is unable to reconstruct the set di erence from a product of two sketches, the node then makes an additional reconciliation request, similar to the initial one, but this request is applied to only a fraction of possible messages (e.g., to transactions in the range 0x0-0x8). Because of the linearity of sketches, a sketch of a subset of transactions would allow the node to compute a sketch for the remainder, which saves bandwidth.
However, this approach would allow recovery of at most 2d di erences, where d is the estimated set di erence in the initial step.
ReconcileBisec: Even though bisections are not limited to one and may be applied consequentially without losing e ciency, in our implementation a er a reconciliation step failure we allow only one bisection with a new overall estimate 2d (see Fig. 8 ).
e bisection process is illustrated in protocol Reconcile-Bisec in Figure 7 .
If bisection fails, then Erlay falls back to the original INV-GETDATA protocol (Fig. 3) and applies it to all of the transactions in two sets being reconciled.
IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
In this section we describe low-level design decisions required to implement Erlay and increase its bandwidth e ciency (R2) and make it robust to collision-based DoS a acks (R4).
Library implementation. We created Minisketch 2 , a C++ library with 3305 LOC, which is an optimized implementation of the PinSketch [18] algorithm. We benchmarked the library to verify that set reconciliation would not create high computational workload on Bitcoin nodes. Fig. 9 shows the decoding performance on an Intel Core i7-7820HQ CPU of our library (Minisketch) as compared to CPISync [54] 3 for varying di erence sizes. Our library has submillisecond performance for di erence sizes of 100 elements or fewer. As we will show later (Fig. 13) this performance is suciently fast for the di erences we observe in practice (in simulation and in deployment).
We used this library to build a reference implementation of Erlay as a part of the Bitcoin Core so ware, which we evaluate in Section 9. Short identi ers and salting. e size of a transaction ID in the Bitcoin protocol is 32 bytes. To use PinSketch [18] , we have to use shorter, 64 bit, identi ers. Using fewer bits reduces the bandwidth usage by 75% (R2), but it also creates a probability of collisions. Collisions in transaction relay are an a ack surface, because a malicious actor may ood a network with colluding transactions and ll memory pools of the nodes with transactions, which would then be propagated and con rmed in a very slow manner. us we want to secure the protocol against such a acks (R4).
While collisions on one side of a communication are easy to detect and handle, collisions involving transactions on both sides may cause a signi cant slowdown. To mitigate this, we use di erent salt (random data added to an input of a hash-function) while hashing transaction IDs into short identi ers. e salt value is enforced by the peer that initiates the connection, and per Erlay's design, requests reconciliation. Since the peer requesting reconciliation also computes the reconciliation di erence, the requestor peer would have to deal with short IDs of unknown transactions. Since salt is chosen by the requestor, re-using the same salt for di erent reconciliations would allow him to compare salted short IDs of unknown transactions to the IDs received during ooding from other peers at the same time. Low-fanout di usion delay. Bitcoin ooding mitigates timing a acks [46] and in-ight collisions by introducing a random delay into transaction announcements. For timing a acks Bitcoin assumes that an a acker connects (possibly, multiple times) to the node (or takes over a fraction of outbound connections of the node). In a low-fanout model, this a ack is not feasible, because transactions are ooded through outbound connections only.
In-ight collisions are also not possible in the case of low-fanout relay through only outbound links, because transactions are always announced in the same direction of a link.
In consideration of these arguments as well as to reduce latency, Erlay has a lower random di usion interval. Instead of usingT oi = 2 seconds for outbound connections and T ii = 5 seconds for inbound, Erlay uses T oi = 1 seconds for outbound. Reconciliation di usion delay. Even though in Erlay timing attacks by observing low-fanout ooding are not feasible, an a acker would be able to perform them through reconciliations. To make timing a acks through reconciliations more expensive to perform, 2 h ps://github.com/sipa/minisketch 3 h ps://github.com/trachten/cpisync we enforce every peer to respond to reconciliation requests a er a small random delay (in our implementation, a Poisson-distributed random variable which is on average T r i = 1 seconds), which is shared across reconciliation requests from all peers, and we ratelimit reconciliations per peer.
is measure would make Erlay be er than BTCFlood at withstanding timing a acks.
Our measure in Erlay has the same idea as in ooding/low-fanout di usion; however, having the ratio T ii /T oi higher makes timing a acks less accurate, because during T ii (the average time before an a acker receives a transaction) a transaction would be propagated to more nodes in the network.
We chose the interval of 1 seconds because a lower interval would make Erlay more susceptible to timing a acks than Bitcoin, and a higher interval results in a high latency.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
In evaluating Erlay we focus on answering the following three questions:
(1) How does Erlay compare to BTCFlood in latency (the time that it takes for the transaction to reach all of the nodes) and bandwidth (the number of bits used to disseminate a transaction)? (2) How do the two parts of Erlay (low-fanout ooding and reconciliation) perform at scale and with varying connectivity, varying number of nodes, and varying transaction rates? (3) How do malicious nodes impact Erlay's performance?
We use measurement results from two sources to answer the questions above. First, we used a simulator to simulate Erlay on a single machine (Section 8). Second, we implemented Erlay in the mainline Bitcoin client and deployed a network of Erlay clients on the Azure cloud across several data centers (Section 9).
Simulator design. Our simulation was done with ns3. We modi ed an open-source Bitcoin Simulator [26] to support transaction relay. e original simulator had 9663 LOC; the version we modi ed has 9948 LOC.
Our simulator is based on the INV-GETDATA transaction relay protocol (see Section 2). It is parameterized by the current ratio of public nodes to private nodes in the Bitcoin network and the transaction rate based on the historical data from the Bitcoin network (7 transactions per second on average). We simulate the di erent ratios of faults in the network by introducing Black Hole nodes, which receive transactions but do not relay them.
Our simulator does not account for heterogeneous node resources, the block relay phase, the joining and leaving of nodes during the transaction relay phase (churn), and does not consider sophisticated malicious nodes.
e propagation latency measured for BTCFlood by our simulator matches the value suggested for the validation of Bitcoin simulators [22] , and our measured bandwidth matches our analytical estimates.
Topology of the simulated network. We emulated a network similar to the current Bitcoin network, since inferring the Bitcoin network topology is non-trivial [46] . In our simulation we bootstrapped the network in two phases: (1) public nodes connected to each other using a limit of eight outbound connections, then (2) private nodes connected to eight random public nodes. In some experiments we increased connectivity, as indicated in the experiment's description. Unless stated otherwise, our simulation results are for a network of 6,000 public nodes and 54,000 private nodes (this is the scale of today's network 4 ). In each experiment we rst used the above two steps to create the topology, then we relayed transactions for 600 seconds (on average, we generated 4,200 transactions from random private nodes).
SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we use simulation to demonstrate latency, bandwidth consumption, and security of Erlay and compare them to BTCFlood.
Relay bandwidth usage
To verify that Erlay scales be er than BTCFlood as the connectivity increases, we varied the number of outbound connections per node and measured the bandwidth used for announcing transactions. Figure 10 shows the results.
With BTCFlood, relay bandwidth increases linearly with the connectivity because BTCFlood announces transactions on every link in the network. With Erlay, however, bandwidth consumption grows signi cantly slower. Erlay seamlessly embraces higher connectivity, which allows for be er security.
Transaction announcements in overall bandwidth. To demonstrate that Erlay's announcement optimization impacts overall bandwidth, we measure the bandwidth consumed by a simulated network to relay transactions with BTCFlood and with Erlay. Fig. 11 plots the results for simulations in which every node establishes 8 connections. Erlay's announcement bandwidth is just 12.8% of the relay bandwidth, while for BTCFlood the announcement bandwidth is 47.6%.
Breaking down Erlay's bandwidth usage. To further understand Erlay's bandwidth usage, we broke it down by the di erent parts of the protocol: low-fanout ooding, reconciliation, and postreconciliation announcements. Table 1 lists the results. e table shows that about a third of the bandwidth is used by reconciliation, while low-fanout ooding accounts for a majority of the bandwidth. e post-reconciliation INVs account for a small fraction of Erlay's bandwidth.
Set reconciliation e ectiveness. To understand the e ectiveness of Erlay's set reconciliation, we measured how o en reconciliation or the following bisection protocol fail. Fig. 12 reports the results aggregated from one of our simulation runs with 60,000 nodes. e end-to-end probability of reaching fallback is below 1%. Since bisection does not introduce additional bandwidth overhead (while fallback does), the overall reconciliation overhead is low.
Since every reconciliation round requires a set di erence estimation, we measured the distribution of the estimated di erence sizes. Fig. 13 demonstrates that set di erence depends on transaction rate. is is expected: for the same reconciliation intervals, a higher transaction rate would result in both reconciling parties receiving more transactions and would lead to a larger set di erence. is dependency between set di erence and transaction rate allows accurate set di erence estimation. Fig. 12 illustrates that Erlay's estimate is correct 96% of the time. For the cases where Erlay over-estimates and the initial reconciliation fails, the resulting bandwidth overhead constitutes 9% of the overall bandwidth.
In our library benchmarks the decode time for a sketch containing 100 di erences is under 1 millisecond (Fig. 9) .
us, the computational cost of operating over sketches with the distribution in Fig. 13 is negligible. 
Relay latency
Fig. 14 plots the average latency for a single transaction to reach all nodes for Erlay and BTCFlood as we vary the total number of nodes. In this set of experiments we kept constant the ratio between private and public types of nodes at 9 : 1 (this is the ratio in today's Bitcoin network). Erlay has a constant latency overhead on top of BTCFlood that is due to its use of batching. However, this overhead is just 2.6 seconds and changes at approximately the same rate with the number of nodes as BTCFlood's latency. Erlay's per-transaction latency can be reduced at the cost of higher bandwidth usage. is is a tunable parameter, subject to design constraints.
We chose to pay this latency overhead, because this is acceptable cost to maximize bandwidth e ciency, as we demonstrate in Section 10.
One of Erlay's goals is to enable higher connectivity. We therefore analyzed the latency of Erlay and BTCFlood for di erent connectivities of the network. Figure 15 demonstrates that, as the connectivity increases, latency signi cantly decreases for BTCFlood (at high bandwidth cost), and only slightly decreases for Erlay without signi cant e ect on bandwidth.
To understand how transactions propagate across the network, we measured the latency to reach a certain fraction of nodes in the network. Latency under faulty condition We also evaluated Erlay's latency in a simple adversarial se ing. For this we simulated a network in which 10% of the public nodes are black holes and measured the time for a transaction to reach all nodes. While it is According to our measurements, while the slowdown with BTCFlood in this se ing is 2%, the slowdown with Erlay is 20%. We believe that this latency increase is acceptable for a batching-based protocol. We have ideas for heuristics that might be applied to mitigate black-hole a acks and make Erlay less susceptible. For example, a node might avoid reconciling with those outbound connections that regularly provide the fewest new transactions.
Scalability with transaction rate
To demonstrate that bandwidth savings and latency are not impacted by higher transaction rates, we simulated a network of 54,000 private and 6,000 public nodes with connectivity of 8, generated transactions at di erent rates (from 7 tx/s to 70 tx/s), and measured the impact of higher transaction rates on latency and bandwidth. Figure 17 shows that the relative bandwidth savings of Erlay is not impacted by transaction rate. Figure 18 shows that Erlay's latency remains constant for di erent transaction rates. We also Private node spies BTCFlood Erlay  5%  18%  16%  10%  20%  20%  30%  20%  27%  60%  21%  31%  Table 2 : Success rate of rst-spy estimator with variable number of private spying nodes in BTCFlood and Erlay.
Public node spies BTCFlood Erlay 5% 11% 11% 10% 19% 15% 30% 52% 32% 60% 82% 67% Table 3 : Success rate of rst-spy estimator with variable number of public spying nodes in BTCFlood and Erlay.
con rmed these results in a network of 100 nodes running our prototype implementation.
Withstanding timing attacks
One of Erlay's design goals is to be more robust to timing a acks from sybils [17, 28] .
To evaluate Erlay's robustness against timing a acks, we simulated a network of 60,000 nodes and used rst-spy estimator approach to link transactions to nodes of their origin.
With the rst-spy estimator an a acker deploys some number of spy nodes. Each node keeps a local log of timestamped records, each of which records (1) when the spy rst learned about a transaction, and (2) from which node the spy learned it. In our setup, at the end of the experiment the spy nodes aggregate their logs and estimate that the source node of a transaction is the node which was the very rst one to announce the transaction (to any of the spies). Tables 2 and 3 list the success rates of the rst-spy estimator for di erent number of spies, which were either private or public nodes.
While Erlay is more susceptible to spying by private nodes (Tables 2), we believe that this is acceptable for three reasons. (1) e success rate is below 50% for both protocols, which means that this deanonymization a ack is unreliable, (2) the di erence between the two protocols is at most 10%, and (3), Erlay is materially more susceptible to spying when there are higher levels of private spying nodes (30%). At this level, an a ack with public spies is a more reasonable alternative since the a acker must control fewer nodes to achieve a higher a ack success rate.
By contrast, Erlay increases the cost of the deanonymization a ack by public nodes (Table 3) : an a acker must control more long-running public nodes in the network with Erlay than with BTCFlood to achieve the same a ack rate.
We also measured that increasing the connectivity with Erlay does not change success rate of rst-spy estimation. Figure 19 : Comparison of con gurations of the Erlay-style protocol along the latency-bandwidth trade-o , as compared to BTCFlood (which does ooding only and no reconciliation). All points except for BTCFlood perform reconciliation on all links. Each point varies the choice of the number of peers to flood to that are inbound (out of 8 total), and outbound (out of 100% total). Points with the same inbound/outbound con gurations have the same color. We split the points across two plots for readability.
Reconciliation and ooding trade-o
Erlay's design combines ooding with reconciliation to achieve a balance between two extremes: the current ooding-only protocol in Bitcoin (BTCFlood), and a reconciliation-only protocol. is intuition is captured in the latency-bandwidth trade-o diagram in Figure 6 . However, does Erlay actually strike a balance? And, what other intermediate protocol alternatives lie between ooding-only and reconciliation-only designs?
A key design choice in Erlay is to ood transactions to 8 outbound peers and none to the inbound peers. We have also considered other alternatives while designing Erlay. Although a full exposition of the design space is beyond the scope of this paper, we present a limited comparison of the latency-bandwidth trade-o for several other protocol variants that use a di erent choice of ooding inbound/outbound peers. Speci cally, we used our simulator to collect data about versions of the Erlay protocol that use X inbound peers and Y outbound peers for ooding (while using reconciliation on all links including X and Y ), for di erent values of X and Y .
We ran several experiments, with each experiment being a protocol con guration that select a speci c X inbound and Y outbound values. In these experiments we simulated a network of 24,000 private and 6,000 public nodes and relayed a total of 1,000 transactions 5 . We collected transaction latency and bandwidth usage for each experiment and Figure 19 plots the results. Figure 19 shows that BTCFlood and Reconciliation-only indeed lie at opposite ends of the trade-o spectrum (top le for BTCFlood and bo om right for Reconciliation-only). And, most key, Erlay lies closer to the bo om le corner than either con guration. is gure also shows that con gurations with other choices of values 5 We restricted the network size to constraint the experiment running time
BTCFlood Erlay Base cost (MB) (TX+GETDATA) 27 27 Other messages (MB) Table 4 : Prototype measurements collected from a 100-node deployment comparing the latency and bandwidth of the BTCFlood in the reference implementation against our Erlay implementation.
for X and Y get close to the le corner. But they do not strike as good a balance between latency and bandwidth as Erlay does.
REFERENCE IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
We implemented Erlay as part of Bitcoin Core. For this we added 584 LOC, not including Minisketch. We used a network of 100 Azure nodes located in 6 data centers, running a reference implementation of our protocol integrated in Bitcoin Core node so ware, to evaluate Erlay in deployment. We generated and relayed 1000 transactions, all originating from one node with a rate of 7 transactions per second. We compared the average latency and bandwidth of Erlay versus Bitcoin's current implementation. Table 4 summarizes our results. According to our measurements, Erlay introduced a latency increase of 0.2 seconds, while saving 40% of the overall node bandwidth.
As in our simulations, Erlay has a higher latency but lower bandwidth cost, con rming our original design intent (Fig. 6 ).
DISCUSSION
Reconciliation-only relay. We believe that a reconciliation-only transaction relay protocol would be inherently susceptible to timing a acks that could reveal the source of the transaction. Unlike ooding, reconciliation is inherently bi-directional: an inbound connection for one peer is an outbound connection for another peer. Delays cannot be applied per-direction but rather per-link.
erefore, BTCFlood's di usion delay cannot be used in reconciliation.
Erlay increases latency from 3.15s to 5.75s Erlay increases the time to relay an uncon rmed transaction across all nodes, which is a small fraction of the end-to-end transaction processing (10 minutes).
We tuned Erlay to maximize bandwidth savings assuming that an increase in latency from 3.15s to 5.75s is acceptable. It is possible to tune Erlay to provide the same latency as BTCFlood by reconciling more o en, but this would save 70% of transaction relay bandwidth instead of 84%. If we tuned Erlay to provide the same latency as BTCFlood, we could increase network connectivity and improve the network security without additional bandwidth overhead.
In practice, there are 2 primary implications of transaction relay latency increase.
Block production rate is de ned by block relay latency, which is only indirectly de ned by transaction relay latency: if fewer transactions are relayed, it will take longer for blocks to propagate (since missing transactions have to be relayed and validated). Block production rate is de ned in this way because to maximize the security of the network all miners have to work on the latest block and can avoid generating "orphan" blocks. Because Erlay's latency among public nodes is be er than BTCFlood (Erlay's di usion interval is lower), miners' orphan rate will probably be lower with Erlay. And, because most miners today use an overlay network (e.g., FIBRE), transaction relay latency increase (3.15s to 5.75s with Erlay will have even less impact.
User experience. If a transaction is accepted in an uncon rmed state, then the user perceives the 2.6s latency increase. However, uncon rmed transactions are rarely accepted by users. Instead, users wait for at least 10 minutes to con rm transactions. erefore, we think that Erlay's 2.6s latency increase insigni cantly impacts the users' experience.
Compatibility with Dandelion. Dandelion is an alternative transaction relay protocol introduced to improve the anonymity and robustness to adversarial observers in Bitcoin [23] . Dandelion has two phases: stem (propagation across a single link of ten nodes on average), and u (relay using ooding from the last node in the stem link). Erlay is complimentary with Dandelion: Erlay would replace the u phase in Dandelion, while the stem phase of Dandelion would ood through both inbound and outbound links to preserve the privacy of private nodes.
Backward compatibility. Only about 30% of Bitcoin nodes run the latest release of Bitcoin Core 6 . erefore, Erlay must be backwards compatible. If not all nodes use Erlay, then Erlay may be activated per-link if both peers support it.
Sophisticated timing attacks. In Section 8.4 we demonstrated that Erlay is less susceptible to timing a acks based on the rst-spy 6 h ps://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/ les/charts/security.html estimator. Withstanding more sophisticated a acks (e.g., ngerprinting propagation traces) is an open question for future research.
Mining-related attacks. ere is no direct relationship between Erlay and a acks like sel sh mining [21] . By making timing a acks more expensive, Erlay makes it harder to infer the network topology. Inferring the topology would allow clustering the network by a acking bo lenecks. Clustering the network would then split mining e orts and introduce many orphan blocks until the network clusters recompose. us, Erlay indirectly makes the network stronger.
Relevance to other blockchains. Erlay is relevant to most other deployed blockchains (e.g., Ethereum, Zcash) because they use ooding for transaction relay. Even though there might be a di erence in TXID size or number of connected peers, the di erence that ma ers is transaction rate. As Figures 17 and 18 illustrate, Erlay is theoretically suitable for systems with higher transaction rate.
On the other hand, since PinSketch has quadratic complexity, using it without modi cations would lead to the high computational cost of reconciliation, and higher hardware requirements. To reduce the computational cost of reconciliation, we suggest applying bisection from the rst reconciliation step.
For example, consider a system with a network similar to Bitcoin, but with a throughput of 700 transactions/s. If Erlay is applied in the same way as we suggest for Bitcoin, an average reconciliation set di erence would consist of 1,000 elements. According to the benchmarks, straightforward reconciliation through Minisketch would take 1,000 ms. At the same time, with bisection recursively applied 3 times, 8 chunks consisting of 125 elements would have to be reconciled, and this would take only 20 ms. is result makes Erlay usable for systems with much higher transaction rate.
We do not propose this measure for Bitcoin, because considering the transaction rate in Bitcoin, the computational cost of reconciliation is already low enough.
RELATED WORK
Prior studies of Bitcoin's transaction relay focused on information leakage and other vulnerabilities [23, 46] , and did not consider bandwidth optimization. We believe that our work is the rst to introduce a bandwidth-e cient, low-latency, and robust transaction relay alternative for Bitcoin. Erlay is designed as a minimal change to Bitcoin (584 LOC), in contrast with other proposals that optimize Bitcoin more deeply [20] . Short transaction identi ers. One solution to BTCFlood's inefciency is to use short transaction identi ers. ere are two issues with this solution. First, this only reduces bandwidth cost by a constant factor. In our simulation we found that short identi ers would reduce redundant tra c from 43% to 10%. But, with higher connectivity, redundancy climbs back up faster than it does with Erlay.
e second issue with short IDs is that they would make the system vulnerable to collision-related a acks, requiring a new per-node or per-link secure salting strategy. Blocksonly setting. Bitcoin Core 0.12 introduced a blocksonly se ing in which a node does not send or receive individual transactions; instead, the node only handles complete blocks. As a result, blocksonly has no INV message overhead. In the blocksonly case, nodes will have to relay and receive many transactions at once. is will increase the maximum node bandwidth requirements and cause spikes in block content relay and transaction validation. Reconciliation alternatives. Prior work has also devised multiparty set reconciliation [9, 43] . is approach, however, has additional complexity and additional trust requirements between peers. We believe that the bene ts of such an approach are not substantial enough to justify these limitations.
In addition, reconciliation-based techniques usually provide bandwidth-e ciency under the assumptions where most of the state being reconciled is shared [12, 48] .
Network attacks on Bitcoin and connectivity. e security of the Bitcoin network has been under substantial scrutiny with many published network-related a acks [6-8, 13, 16, 19, 27, 29, 32, 33, 36, 39, 40, 45] . ese a acks a empt to make the network weaker (e.g., increase the probability of double-spending or denials of service) or violate user privacy. Many of these a acks rely on non-mining nodes and assume limited connectivity from victim nodes. Our work allows Bitcoin nodes to have higher connectivity, which we believe will make the network more secure. Prior P2P research. Structured P2P networks are usually based on Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs), in which every peer is responsible for speci c content [38] . In these networks research has explored the use of topology information to make e cient routing decisions [11, 50, 52, 55] . is design, however, makes these protocols leak information about the structure of the network and makes them less robust to Byzantine faults, though limited solutions to Byzantine faults in this se ing have been explored [14, 25] .
e trade-o between latency and bandwidth e ciency is wellknown in P2P research. Kumar et. al. identi ed and formalized the trade-o between latency and bandwidth [34] , and Jiang et. al. proposed a solution to achieve an optimal combination of these properties [30] . However, the solution was not designed for adversarial se ings.
Prior work also proposed feedback-based approaches to ooding [3, 49] . However, we believe that to work e ciently (have a horizon larger than 1), this work would have unacceptable information leakage.
CONCLUSIONS
Bitcoin is one of the most widely used P2P applications. Today, Bitcoin relies on ooding to relay transactions in a network of about 60,000 nodes. Flooding provides low latency and is robust to adversarial behavior, but it is also bandwidth-ine cient and creates a signi cant amount of redundant tra c. We proposed Erlay, an alternative protocol that combines limited ooding with intermi ent reconciliation. We evaluated Erlay in simulation and with a practical deployment. Compared to Bitcoin's current protocols, Erlay reduces the bandwidth used to announce transactions by 84% while increasing the latency for transaction dissemination by 2.6s (from 3.15s to 5.75s). Erlay allows Bitcoin nodes to have higher connectivity, which will make the network more secure. We are actively working to introduce Erlay into Bitcoin Core's node so ware.
